498a IPC is a Legal Terrorism say supreme Court of India:
In The Supreme court of India
Original Jurisdiction
Writ Petition no. 141 of 2005
Sushil Kumar Sharma ... Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Ors. ... Respondents
J U D G E M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT. J.
By this petition purported to have been filed under article 32 of the constitution of India, 1950 (In short ‘The Constitution’) prayer is to declare the Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in Short ‘The IPC’) to be unconstitutional and ultra virus in the alternative to formulate guidelines so that innocent persons are not victimized by unscrupulous persons making false accusations.
Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under section 498A IPC are unfounded, stringent actions should be taken against person making the allegations. This, according to petitioner, would discourage persons from coming go courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of the offence punishable under section 498A IPC has been made with oblique motives and with a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.
According to the petitioner there is no prosecution in these cases but persecution. Reliance has also placed on a decision rendered by learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court wherein concern was shown about the increase in number of false and frivolous allegations made. It was pointed out that accusers are more at fault than the accused. Persons try to take undue advantage of the sympathies exhibited by the courts in matters relating to alleged dowry torture.
Section 498A appears in chapter XXA of IPC.
Substantive Section 498A IPC and Presumptive Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 1972 (ins short ‘Evidence Act’) have been inserted in the respective statutes by criminal law (Section Amendment) Act. 1983.
Section 498A IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act Include in their amplitude past events of cruelty. Period of operation of Section 113-B of the evidence act is seven years, presumption arises when a women committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of marriage.
Section 498A reads as follows:
"498A: Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty – whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment of a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation – For the purpose of this section ‘cruelty’ means –
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whatever mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
Section 113-B reads as follows:-
"113-B: Presumption as to dowry death – When the question is weather a person has committed the dowry death of a women and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty of harassment for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation – For the purpose of this section ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger of life, limb or health, weather mental or physical of the woman is required to be established in order to bring home the application of section 498A IPC. Cruelty has been defined in the explanation for the purpose of section 498A. It is to be noted that section 304-B and 498A, Ipc can not be held to be mutually inclusive. these provisions deal with tow distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The explanation to section 498A gives the meaning of ‘cruelty’. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of ‘cruelty’. But having regard to common background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of ‘cruelty’ or ‘harassment’ is the same as prescribed in the Explanation of section 498A under which ‘cruelty’ by itself amounts to an offence.
The object for which section 498A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and reason while enacting Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act No. 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminates in suicide by or murder of the helpless women concerned, which constitutes only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC< the code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (in short ‘the CR. P. C.’) and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with the cases of dowry death but also the cases of cruelty of married women by the husband, in-laws and relatives. The avowed object it to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty.
One other provision which is relevant to be noted is section-306 IPC. The basic difference between the two Sections i.e. Section 306 and section 498A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives drag the woman concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended.
It is well settled that more possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate a legislation. It must be presumed, unless contrary is proved, that administration and application of a particular law would be done "not with an evil eye and unequal hand" {(SEE: A.Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti. Authorized Officer and Income-Tax Officer and another) AIR 1956 SC 246}.
In Budhan Choudhry and others v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1955 SC 191) a contention was raised that a provision of law may not be discriminatory but it may land itself to abuse bringing about discrimination between the persons similarly situated. This court repelled that contention holding that on the possibility of abuse of provision by the authority, the legislation may be held arbitrary or discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the constitution.
From the decided cases in India as well as United States of America, the principles appeaser to be well settled that if a statutory provision is otherwise intra-vires, constitutional and valid, more possibility of abuse of power in a given case would not make it objectionable, ultra-vires or unconstitutional. In such cases, "action" and not the "section" may be vulnerable. If it is so the court by upholding the provision of law, may still set aside the action, order of decision and grant appropriate relief to the person aggrieved.
In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. And Ors. V. Union of India and Ors. (1997 (5) SCC 536), a Bench of 9 Judges observed that mere possibility of abuse of provision by those in charge of administrating it cannot be a ground for holding a provision procedurally or substantively unreasonable. In Collector of Customs v Nathella Sampathu Chetty (1962 (3) SCR 786) this court observed.
"The possibility of abuse of a statue otherwise valid does not impart to it any element of invalidity." It was said in State of Rejesthan v. Union of India (1977 (3) SCC 592) "it must be remembered that merely because power may sometimes be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of power. The wisdom of man has not yet been able to conceive of a Government with power sufficient to answer all its legitimate needs and at the same time incapable of mischief." (Also see: Commissioner H.R.F v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamir of Sri Shirur Meth (1954 SCR 1005)
As observed in Maulavi Hussain Haji Abrahem Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004 (6) SCC 672). Unique Butle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. V. U. P. Financial Corporation and Ors. 2003 (2) SCC 455) and Padam Sundara Rago (dead) and Ors. V. State of T and Ors (2002 (3) SCC 533). While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislatures to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
The Judgement of the Delhi High Court on which reliance was made was rendered in the case of Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand & Ors. In that case while holding that the allegations are regarding commission of offence punishable under section 498A IPC were not made out. Certain observation in general terms were made about the need for legislative changes. The complainant had moved this Court against the Judgement on merits in SPL(CRL)...... of 2003 entitled Savitri Devi vs. Ramesh Chand & Ors. By order dated 28.11.2003 this court observed as follows:
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
Delay condoned.
We do not see any merit in the challenge made to the order of High Court in the Criminal revision No. 462 of 2002, on the facts of the case. The special leave petition is therefore dismissed.
At the same time, we express our disapproval of some of the generalized views expressed in the paragraphs 23 to 32 of the judgement of the High Court by the learned single Judge. The learned Judge ought to have seen that such observations, thought may be appropriate for seminars of workshops, should have been avoided being incorporated as part of the court judgement. Some of the views also touch upon legislative measures and wisdom of the legislative police in substance which according to the learned judge need to be taken into account. There was no scope for considering all such matters in the case which was before the learned judge. It is therefore, appropriate that such generalized observations or views should meticulously avoided by the Courts in the judgements."
Above being the position we find no substance in the plea that section 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation.
The object of provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contented by the petitioner, many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignomy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent the abuse of well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a license to unscrupulous person to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore become necessary for the legislature to find out ways How the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism cam be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin's weapon. If cry of wolf is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual wolf appears. There is no question of investigation agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and courts start with the presumption that accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have t ace on circumstantial evidence while dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.
Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short the 'CBI') in certain matters where the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. we do not find any substance in this plea. It the petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if held.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
.......................J
(ARIJIT PASAYAT) .
.......................J
(H. K. SEMA) .
New Delhi
July 19. 2005
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Sunday, May 29, 2011
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Bail under 498a/406 IPC
Anticipatory Bail/Bail in 498a/406/IPC
"There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage. Long thereafter on 6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was offered.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 773 OF 2003
Sundar Babu & Ors. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Tamil Nadu ...Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court rejecting the petition filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').
Background facts in short are as follows:
Sukanya (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant') was married with Sunder Babu-appellant No.1. Appellant No. 2-Mr. Venugopal and Mrs.Ramathilagam appellant No.3 are the parents of Sunder Babu. A.4-Rajinishree is his sister and Andalammal is his maternal grandmother. The marriage took place on 25/11/1998. The appellant No.1 left for USA on 1/7/1999. The complaint was filed on 6/2/2000 alleging commission of offence punishable under Sec.498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short `D.P. Act').
The complaint was treated as First Information Report and investigation was undertaken. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed on 8/6/2000. A divorce petition was filed by the complainant, which appears to have been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001. According to the appellants, complainant - Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002. It was a stand of the appellant that the complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The allegations were unfounded. There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage. Long thereafter on 6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was offered. In essence, it was submitted that the continuance of the proceedings will be an abuse of the process of law. The prosecuting agency before the High Court contested the petition filed under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses commission of alleged offences and therefore it is not a case, which needed to be allowed. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent-State and dismissed the application.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the factual scenario indicated above and even a cursory glance of the complaint petition shows that the same was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate the accused persons. Learned counsel for the respondent State supported the judgment.
Though the scope for interference while exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:
1 Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2 Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code.
3 Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4 Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.
5 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6 Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7 Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra).
The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances, under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law, which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine, which finds expression in the section, which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent
in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action, which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1 ) and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359). (See (2008) 11 SCALE 20)
Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The proceedings in Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Palladam, are quashed.
The appeal is allowed.
J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)
J. (P. SATHASIVAM)
New Delhi,
February 19, 2009.
"There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage. Long thereafter on 6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was offered.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 773 OF 2003
Sundar Babu & Ors. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Tamil Nadu ...Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court rejecting the petition filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').
Background facts in short are as follows:
Sukanya (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant') was married with Sunder Babu-appellant No.1. Appellant No. 2-Mr. Venugopal and Mrs.Ramathilagam appellant No.3 are the parents of Sunder Babu. A.4-Rajinishree is his sister and Andalammal is his maternal grandmother. The marriage took place on 25/11/1998. The appellant No.1 left for USA on 1/7/1999. The complaint was filed on 6/2/2000 alleging commission of offence punishable under Sec.498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short `D.P. Act').
The complaint was treated as First Information Report and investigation was undertaken. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed on 8/6/2000. A divorce petition was filed by the complainant, which appears to have been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001. According to the appellants, complainant - Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002. It was a stand of the appellant that the complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The allegations were unfounded. There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage. Long thereafter on 6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was offered. In essence, it was submitted that the continuance of the proceedings will be an abuse of the process of law. The prosecuting agency before the High Court contested the petition filed under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses commission of alleged offences and therefore it is not a case, which needed to be allowed. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent-State and dismissed the application.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the factual scenario indicated above and even a cursory glance of the complaint petition shows that the same was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate the accused persons. Learned counsel for the respondent State supported the judgment.
Though the scope for interference while exercising jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it can be made in cases as spelt out in the case of Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:
1 Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2 Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec.155(2) of the Code.
3 Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4 Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.
5 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6 Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7 Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra).
The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down by this Court in several cases.
The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances, under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law, which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine, which finds expression in the section, which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent
in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action, which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1 ) and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359). (See (2008) 11 SCALE 20)
Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The proceedings in Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Palladam, are quashed.
The appeal is allowed.
J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)
J. (P. SATHASIVAM)
New Delhi,
February 19, 2009.
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